capitalism that is characterized by negative complementarities between the organization of business into sprawling, diversified groups, strong presence by multinational companies (MNCs), atomistic labor relations and low investments in skills and technology. The result is continued low productivity growth and thus, sustained structural inequality and long term low growth.
However, Central America also presents some particular characteristics that are not well accounted for in this literature. First, as our study of Central American DBGs reveal, although many have a hierarchical structure, they are highly interlinked between each other in a way that makes in necessary to study networks between them as well as hierarchical relations coordinating the companies within them. Second, close integration of the business groups across the region in spite of much dissimilarity in national institutional contexts, presents a challenge to the VOC literature that is frequently criticized for being too nationally focused Fourth, the frequent critique against the static nature of the VoC approach becomes even more problematic in the small, open Central American countries that are highly vulnerable to changes in the international economic context. These are issues that will be addressed throughout this book.
Although we situate this study in an international literature, the emergence of the evolution of the DBGs in Central America is also highly conditioned on the region's economic history.
Thus, in the following, we will first discuss the defining characteristics of business groups, before we give a brief historical account of the emergence and evolution of the currently dominating business groups in Central America and the economic performance of the region.
Subsequently we will outline the main arguments of this book and sketch out the remaining chapters.
Defining characteristics and varieties of business groups
There is little agreement in the literature about how to define the sprawling networks of companies, mutual share-holderships, families and political interest-groups dominating the political economy of several Central American countries. In most of the literature specific to the region these have been conceptualized through concepts that somehow attempt to capture simultaneously their economic resources and their influence on political decisions. Some take an explicit or implicit structural or Marxist point of departure and talk about ruling classes capture the simultaneous economic and political clout of big business. We have taken a different approach; our starting point is the more specific figure of the business group typically defined as 'legally independent firms, operating in multiple (often unrelated) industries, which are bound together by persistent formal (e.g. equity) and informal (e.g. family) ties ' (Khanna and Yafeh 2007, p. 331) . We have chosen this as our main focus of as we have needed a more precise definition than the ones referred to above in order to make a multi-sectoral comparison across national contexts, such as intended here.
However, the concept of business group also encompasses a number of variations. Business groups differ, regarding the kind of ties that bind the different enterprises within the group together, their internal ownership structure, and their degree of diversification. The linkages that bind the business groups together may include mutual share-holdership, close market ties (such as inter-firm transactions), and/or social relations (family, kinship or personal friendship ties) through which they coordinate to achieve mutual objectives. Regarding ownershipstructure, some might be of the network type, defined as a constellation of legally independent companies that cooperate for common, long-term goals, whereas others are hierarchies in which a holding company owns and controls legally independent operating units, usually organized as subsidiaries and affiliates. Within the latter group one may further distinguish between multicompany firms which transact in different markets but which does so under common entrepreneurial and financial control, and pyramidal business groups that allow owners to tunnel profits from second and third tier subsidiaries to owners (Colpan and Hikino
2011)).
Another difference is whether the group is presented as a group. Rettberg argues for example that business groups are 'networks of legally independent firms, affiliated with one another through mutual shareholding or by direct family ownership under a common group name' (Rettberg 2005). However, in Central America, we find a number of constellations of networks of companies with mutual shareholdership that do not appear under a common name, but that are nevertheless bound together by persistent relations. Moreover, often time we find formal groups with owners that also own a number of companies that are not formally in the group but that are financially and administratively coordinated with the rest. This complicates significantly the identification of groups since one needs a lot of knowledge about the relations between the different companies in order to conclude about whether they belong to the same group.
Our strategy to diminish, if not overcome, this problem has been to focus on the family owned groups. These are the overwhelmingly dominant ones in Central America, and starting with the family or family network has helped us to identify the business groups. Our definition of a diversified business group is thus: a set of legally independent firms, operating in multiple This does not mean that families necessarily own the companies exclusively. As pointed out by Khanna and Yafeh (2007, p. 331) , varying degrees of participation of outside investors characterize many business groups around the world, also the family owned. In Central America, the degree of shareholding between different business groups is also widespread and it can sometimes be difficult to decide where one group ends and the other starts.
Nevertheless, for our purposes, we start with the business groups, and secondly, intend to unravel the networks and connections between the different groups. (between 1999 and 1903) , but over 6,000 hectares of land. This platform was used to establish itself first, as a leading coffee producers, but subsequently diversified into finance (Banco del Comercio), electrical utilities, and sugar estate s (Paige 1997, p. 18). Their current main activity is production of sugar and derivatives.
The control that the coffee-elite acquired over banks later impacted on the development of business groups in many ways. An important hypothesis in the literature on diversified business groups, is that business groups form with a financial institution in their midst in processed in artisanal form) and fabrication of rum and other liquors (Fonseca 1996, p. 146) .
In 1929, sugar made up only between 1.3% (in Guatemala) and 4.9% (in El Salvador) of the export income of the sugar producing countries (that excluded Costa Rica) (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987, p.37) . In the 1950s it went through a modernization process led by local groups such as Grupo Pellas-Lacayo in Nicaragua and supported by local banks, in the case of the Grupo Pellas-Lacayo, of Banic and Banamer. This led to increased milling capacity and efficiency that enabled the Central American producers to benefit from the market opportunities occurring in the United States after the Cuban revolution had led it to close the market for However, it was not only the protection of the CACM that provided business opportunities. A major additional source of diversification was governmentally sanctioned private monopolies in the production of basic goods and sometimes services. There were different reasons for their monopoly status: many sectors enjoyed high tariff protection, but in addition many industries enjoyed governmental price regulations such as the cement industry, they have been regulated by private associations that controlled prices and entry of new actors (as for example the sugar industry in Guatemala), exclusive governmental contracts (as for example in the pharmaceutical industry), or they emerged due to the exclusive support by the state to specific industries an later managed to keep their position due to high entry barriers. Of the sectors that have been highly monopolistic we find the production and distribution of beer, liquor, flour, rice, poultry, sugar, flour, rice, poultry, and cement, as well as the distribution of gasoline, and pharmaceuticals in addition to the governmentally owned services that generally were monopolies in most part of the world including electricity and telecommunication (Férnandez 2005 , Tábora 2007 , Romero 2006 , Molina 2007 ).
The lost decade and the economic transformation
In much of Latin America the 1980s is named "the lost decade" due to the unraveling of the deb-crisis, and with that, the collapse of the development model that had characterized the region since the 1950s. However, for Central America, the 1980s were lost in economic terms for an additional reason, namely the conflicts ravaging Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala with reverberations across the region. The combined effect of the reduction of agricultural production, the fiscal-and, for some countries, debt-crisis, and the end of the cold war that facilitated the peace-accords and the end to insurgencies and military dictatorships, was a transformation of the economic model. Yet, this transformation was crucially influenced by a set of economic reforms implemented across the region. Although there were very significant differences between the countries, one may sum up the reforms with the most significant implications for the DBGs under three major headlines: the modernization of the state and de-monopolization/privatization of public services, the support of a new development model and the liberalization of trade and opportunities for foreign investment. In sum, these reforms The atomistic labor relations and low levels of skills and training complement the dominance of MNCs and business groups, since both MNCs and business groups have relatively low demand for skilled labor and weak incentives to press for widespread investment in education and training and the absence of a large pool of skilled workers discouraged domestic firms from investing in upgrading their production or in other higher technology sectors, and instead encouraged domestic firms to target lower technology investments where appropriate skills were abundant in the labor market (Schenider 2013, p. 26).
Understanding business group strategies in open and changing institutional contexts
The debate about the political economy of Central America has long been quite polarized. In the process of economic reforms from the late 1980s, some saw the state as the main culprit of stagnant growth and low productivity. With its allegedly bloated state apparatuses, myriad of regulation and red-tape, and inefficient bureaucracies, it was viewed as stifling business initiatives, out-crowding private investments, and contributing to business-hostile macroeconomic volatility. As elsewhere, the solution was to be found in unleashing business initiatives by reducing and reforming the state presence. However, while surveys attempting to unveil the views of business on the main obstacles to their growth flourished, often conducted by private sector think-tanks, very little research was done on the ownership structure of the companies, their main strategies and investments: the focus was on the state and how it should be reformed.
Against this, it was argued that the problem was not the magnitude of the state or its presence in the economy, but rather that it had always favored a small elite of capitalists that were preoccupied with serving their own interest, not that of the countries as a whole. Yet, having structural rather than institutional focus, their main concern was to reveal the concentration of capital in the hands of a ruling class and how it influenced state policies, and not how they organized and reorganized their enterprises and the implications that had for the economy as such.
This book is an attempt to carve out a different position by focusing on the business groups, their internal organization, how they try to both influence and adapt to a volatile economic environment and rapidly changing institutional context. As such, we not only attempt to contribute to debates about Central American development, but also to the international literature on why DBGs emerge and thrive, and whether they represent important In Central America, hierarchical relations are evident in the daily operation of the groups, and the command that the group leaders have over an array of companies in different sectors provides a crucial resource in their survival and growth. However, the hierarchies also characterize the MNC structure and their introduction to Central America has shifted the kind of hierarchies that the companies relate to. This is evident in the access to technology, but also in some countries access to finance. Moreover, in the current process of regionalization new hierarchies are formed when groups from one country buy a number of independent companies in the neighboring countries. Our argument is that while hierarchies characterize the relationship between DBGs and MNCs, as well as between the large DBGs and smaller groups and independent companies, networks characterize the relations between several of the large DBGs and important political institutions. Networks are strengthened when DBGs pool resources in order to make investments in the magnitude needed to compete with MNCs; networks are also needed when red-tape is to be overcome, governmental bids are to be won, or licenses acquired. These networks are distinct from the coordination found in the CMEs because they are based on a set of informal institutions that are stable and long term and not up for negotiation. The long term nature of hierarchies and networks stand in contrast to the atomistic relationship with labor and the relative isolation from local communities, and the privileged position in such networks give the DBGs a permanent role in the economies.
Further, because of the structural and long-standing characteristics of the networks in which DBGs are embedded, groups are often better able than independent companies to coordinate and get access to tangible and intangible resources, exploit external economic and policy opportunities, upgrade their managerial and technological capabilities, and strengthen their market dominance even in the presence of a rapidly changing institutional context. The interlinks and complementarities between groups' resources, capabilities and strategies, on the one hand, and the institutional characteristics of the environment in which they operate, on the other, represents a major avenue to explain the resilience and continued superiority that DBGs are proving to have in developing economies worldwide. We will explore this research avenue in the next chapters.
Research strategies, methods and the plan for the book
This book is based on a multidisciplinary approach and has sought to combine a number of different methods for data-collection and analysis. We have made use of six principal sources of data. First, where existing we have used public registries. Those are available mainly in the Company register in Panama. There are also some data (on company ownership and composition of boards) in the Mercantile Register in the National Center for Registries (CNR) in El Salvador. Second, we have used company web-sites and websites of business associations. Particularly export associations maintain useful websites with overviews over companies associated, but also some other organizations have such information available.
Third, we have used newspapers and business magazines particularly to gain information about mergers and acquisitions or the investment in new projects. Newspapers and magazines have also been a valuable source about the political strategies of business groups. Fourth, we have undertaken a survey among both group affiliated and stand-alone firms in the region on their internationalization strategies. However, in spite of having sent hundreds of requests of participating and spent considerable resources on follow-up calls, we received a too low number of responses to be able to lend much importance to this survey. The results are referred to in chapter 6, but interpreted with care and cross-checked with other data. Fifth, we have conducted a number of interviews with business group leaders and with experts knowledgeable about them. This has been used to correct the material we had already collected in order to get a better idea of their strategies, the companies belonging to the groups and importantly, on the evolution of their groups over time. Sixth, and finally, we have complemented our own data with data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey 2010-2011.
With the exception of the surveys (our own and that of the World Bank), the data has been used to compose a database (discussed further in chapter 2) that has been the basis for a substantial part of the analysis. This analysis has been done at three different levels: the regional (Central American) level, the national level, and the level of individual DBGs. As a result, Central America is sometimes treated as a unit, when we talk about Central American groups, and sometimes it is treated as the universe and the six different countries are the units that are compared in the analysis. Moreover, we have attempted to combine the study of the state of affairs today with process analysis, tracing developments over time to investigate how institutional and policy changes coevolve with groups' strategies in a long run perspective We have also used a variety of techniques and methodologies for analysis. Chapters 5 and 6 uses quantitative techniques to reach conclusions about the export performance and innovativeness of group related firms compared to stand-alone firms, and to analyze how that performance can be explained by pointing to institutional variables. In this case, different institutions are given values as 'strong' or 'weak'. In the following chapters, we 'unpack' several of these institutions and describe them in more qualitative terms as well as attempt to uncover aspects of their co-evolution with the DBG strategies. Thus, we move both from a quantitative to a qualitative approach, and from an 'outside' view attempting to sustain causal mechanisms, to an 'inside' view aimed at interpreting institutions and sequences of events within their national and historical context. In other words: we move from an explanatory to an interpreting mode of analysis and from asking questions of 'why?' to also including an investigation of the 'how?' and the underlying explanatory process.
Applying such a multitude of methods and techniques has its clear advantages but also disadvantages. We hope to be able to give a thorough picture of the Central American DBGs, the transformations they are currently undergoing and how that is affected by the institutional context, while at the same time affecting it. However, the book does not intend to provide a parsimonious model for institution-DBG interaction or a clear prediction of where the Central American DBGs are headed. Rather, it attempts to provide a coherent framework to interpret the complexity of the realities of these small, but very different, neighboring countries, but without losing sight of the differences between groups, economies, institutions and policies.
The rest of this book is outlined as follows. The next chapter provides an analytical framework for the analysis of the strategies of the Central American DBGs. It draws on the vast comparative literature on the emergence and impact of the DBGs, and on the more specific literature on DBGs and globalization. It further builds on the institutional literature on Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) and DBGs.
Chapter three provides a general overview over the changes that the DBGs have undergone in Central America, along three dimensions: shift in sector focus (differentiation), establishment of relations with MNCs, and expansion abroad. This regional analysis is complemented by an analysis of national trajectories that uses the same variables but attempts to place the national differences in a historical and institutional context.
Chapter four intends to give a 'face' to the DBGs by studying the formation, expansion, sector shifts, alliance formation and political connections of six of the most emblematic business groups in the region: Grupo Multiinversiones (Gutierrez-Bosch) from Guatemala, Grupo Poma from El Salvador, Grupo Continental (Rosenthal) from Honduras, Grupo Pellas from Nicaragua, Grupo Motta from Panama and Grupo Montecristo from Costa Rica.
Chapter 5 focuses on one important strategy of internationalization, export sales, that has so far received only limited attention in the literature. The chapter compares the export performance of the business group affiliated firms to the non-affiliated or "standalone" firms, seeking to explain whether being affiliated with a DBG has positive or negative effect on Central American companies' export sales.
Chapter 6 shifts the focus to the innovation activities of DBGs, and it seeks to scrutinize empirically whether groups' innovative capability and investments increase or decrease when a national economy undertakes a process of institutional change, liberalization and market development.
While these two chapters focus on different development impacts of DBG dominance, chapter 7 and 8 turn to the explanations for differences across countries. In chapter such explanations are sought in differences in institutions regulating the financial sector and how they have evolved over time. This explains the differences in the weight that financial companies have in the groups across the countries, but can also shed light on their general sector preferences.
Chapter 8 turns to the political strategies of the DBGs and attempts to understand how those in part are shaped by their home countries' political institutions and in part shape those. Their strategies are studied across four presidential periods, but a particular weight is put on those periods in which there have been presidents in power that have challenged the core interests of the DBGs.
